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Abstract 
Theories and philosophical approaches in research are crucial to the understanding of the overall perspective 
from which the study is designed and carried out. However, inconsistencies in theory and duality in 
philosophical paradigms leads to predicaments as to which approach is suitable in a certain area of inquiry. This 
paper examines some of the theoretical and philosophical predicaments faced by researchers in corporate 
governance. This is achieved by identifying and discussing controversies in theories and philosophical 
approaches applicable in corporate governance studies. A review of theoretical literature shows lack of a unitary 
perspective to explain the relationship between corporate governance and firm financial performance. 
Consequently, researchers may have to adopt a multi-theory approach by taking views of property rights agency, 
resource based and stewardship and stakeholder’s theories to understand different perspectives of corporate 
governance. The multiplicity of theories and inconsistencies of expected relationships between variables also 
creates dilemma to researchers in predicting the relationships between corporate governance variables and firm 
performance. The duality of philosophical paradigms and divergent assumptions of ways of knowing also creates 
dilemma as to which is the best approach to apply in corporate governance research. This study found that most 
corporate governance studies opts for objectivism position in ontology which leads to positivism view in 
epistemology, associated with value free axiology, deductive approach and application of quantitative methods. 
This is in contrasts to the choice of subjectivism position in ontology which leads to the selection of 
interpretivism stance in epistemology and consequently value laden position in axiology. Subjective approach 
also leads to inductive approach and application of qualitative methods of data collection and analysis. It is 
therefore concluded that identification of ontology at the start of the research process is crucial in determining 
the choice of the research design. 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Theory, Philosophy,  
 
 1.0 Introduction  
Theoretical frameworks and philosophical approaches are crucial in determining the overall perspective from 
which research in social sciences is designed and carried out. A theory has been defined as a set of interrelated 
concepts, definitions and propositions that explains or predicts events or situations by specifying relations among 
variables (Cooper and Schindler, 2003; Kerlinger, 1986). According to Gill and Johnson (2002), a theory is a 
network of hypotheses advanced so as to conceptualize and explain a particular social or natural phenomenon. 
Consequently, each hypothesis presents and statement about the relationship between two or more concepts. 
Arising from these definitions, theories are central to the development of the key concepts, variables and their 
possible interactions to present a systematic view of the phenomena. However, theories by their nature are not 
content or topic specific and researchers have to articulate the specific concepts and variables considered to be 
important in an area of inquiry. Some theories are also inconsistent in the way they predict interrelationships 
among variables. Besides the inconsistencies theories also have limitations which make them insufficient to 
explain the overall perspective of interrelationships in a certain area of investigation. These issues pose 
challenges to researchers while conceptualizing and designing a particular study. 
Research philosophy is described as the foundation of knowledge on which underlying predispositions 
of any study are based (Burke, 2007). Different authors indicate that the philosophical positions adopted in a 
study determines the logical plan of inquiry from the research design, data collection, analysis and interpretation 
of results (Saunders et al., 2009; Sekaran, 2003; Cooper and Schindler, 2003). Selecting the right research 
philosophical stance is important in increasing reliability and validity of the findings (Pathirage, et al., 2008). 
There is however a clear dichotomy in philosophical approaches resulting into a dilemma as to which approach 
is best and relevant to a particular area of study. The divergences in assumptions associated with philosophical 
approaches such as ontology, epistemology and axiology, creates predicaments to researchers as to which 
method is suitable in a line of inquiry and consequently the techniques  of data collection, analysis and 
interpretation.   
The ultimate concern for researchers in corporate governance is to establish the key theories and 
philosophical approaches relevant in this area of inquiry. This study therefore identifies and discusses the key 
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theories in corporate governance, variables arising from the theory and the predicted interrelationships and the 
controversies associated with the theory. The study also examines the dichotomy of philosophical approaches 
and their relevance in corporate governance research. The paper is divided into five sections. Section 1.0 
presents the introduction; section 2.0 discusses the methodology that was used in this study while section 3.0 
defines the concept of corporate governance and theories underpinning research in this subject area. Section 4.0 
analyses key philosophical approaches in social sciences and that their application in corporate governance 
research. Section 5.0 presents the conclusion and the recommendations derived from this study. 
 
2.0 Methodology 
The methodology adopted in this study involves a review and discussion of the theories that guide research in 
corporate governance. This involves identification of key theories, their core principles, key concepts, variables, 
predictable relationships and shortcomings of the theory. The study also discusses the duality of philosophical 
approaches, their assumptions and application in corporate governance research. 
 
3.0Theories of Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance has been defined as the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting returns on their investment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  A widely used definition is 
derived from to the Cadbury Committee which defined it as the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled to ensure maximum return to shareholders (Mallin, 2007). Consequently, corporate governance 
frameworks specify the distribution of rights to income, rules and procedures for making decisions in corporate 
affairs and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as the shareholders, corporate 
boards and managers (OECD, 2004).Given these definitions, most of corporate governance studies focus on 
examining the different ways through which shareholders ensure shareholders get maximum returns of their 
investment.  
While there are numerous plausible proxies for corporate governance, the ownership structure and 
corporate boards are considered to be the key mechanisms of used by shareholders to ensure maximum returns 
on investment and increase in firm value. Ownership structure has been measured using the size and identity of 
shareholders (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; Wei, et al., 2005). Corporate boards indicators widely used include 
the size board size, percentage of outside directors, gender composition (Adusei, 2011; Chaghadari, 2011; 
Yermack, 1996). Financial performance has been measured using several indicators such as accounting based 
ratios, market value and efficiency indicators. Literature survey shows that several theories have been used to to 
predict interrelationships between corporate governance and firm financial performance are: the property rights 
theory, the agency theory, the resource based theory, the stewardship theory and the stakeholder’s theory. These 
theories are discussed in the following subsection. 
 
3.1The Property Rights Theory 
The property rights theory was developed by Coase (1960) and advanced further by Alchian and Demsetz (1973). 
The theory asserts that the size of property rights determines the choices open to decision makers and 
consequently the economic performance. The property rights have been defined as the rights to use, to earn 
income, control, and transfer or exchange the assets (Kim and Mahoney, 2005; Libecap, 1989). The theory views 
the sources of imperfections in the market as unclearly defined and insecure property rights, which make it 
difficult to enforce and to monitor managers. The theory therefore emphasizes the importance of allocation of  
property  rights  as it  gives incentives to the owners to monitor managers, influence  decision making  and  
consequently the financial  performance. The theory also stipulates that property rights could be owned privately, 
by the state, or held in common by the society, and that different holders use the rights distinctively.  
The property rights theory is crucial in corporate governance research as it provides the theoretical basis 
for conceptualizing and predicting the firm performance as a function of the size of ownership and economic 
vested interests among different types of owners. The unit of analysis is a firm and the focus is on property rights 
shared by various investors as they define the incentive and ability to maximize use of the resource. The size of 
ownership is considered an important variable as it defines the holder claims from the firm’s income and 
decision making through voting rights (Grossman and Hart, 1988; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). The identity of 
the shareholder is also an important  variable as owners differ in their vested interests in the firm, resources, and 
ability to monitor managers which could impact on financial performance (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; Wei et 
al., 2005. Consequently one line of empirical  inquiry focuses on examining the interrelationships between 
corporate governance and firm performance using a combination of the size of ownership and the identity of the 
shareholders as the key independent variables (Omran et al., 2008; Ongore, et al., 2011; Thomsen and Pedersen, 
2000; Wei, et al., 2005).   
The property rights theory predicts that the state as an owner will not perform as efficiently as private 
ownership due to the wide separation between ownership and control and focus on social and economic 
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objectives. The individual shareholders are expected to have no impact on firm performance as they do not have 
incentives to influence performance. The theory however has several limitations which make it insufficient to 
explain the relationship between corporate and firm financial performance. The assertion that residual control 
rights of an owner an asset is the ability to exclude others from the use of that asset is violated in practice in 
modern companies as the decision making is delegated by shareholders to the managers. The managers are 
therefore empowered to control the firm which leaves shareholders as mere suppliers of capital. The theory also 
puts more emphasis over the distinction between public and private ownership and therefore overlooks diversity 
of private investors and their possible influence on corporate performance.  
 
3.2Agency Theory 
The Agency theory developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) recognized conflicts of interest between owners 
and agents in modern corporate entities due to the divergent goals arising from wide separation of ownership and 
control. Fama and Jensen (1983) indicate that the managers possess superior knowledge and expertise about the 
firm and are therefore in a position to pursue self-interests rather than shareholder interests. According to La 
Porta et al. (2000), managers expropriate shareholders through asset stripping, diversion of corporate 
opportunities, overpaying executives and use the profits of the firm to benefit themselves rather than the 
investors. Consequently, shareholders interests are compromised if managers maximize their interest at the 
expense of firm profitability and market value. 
Agency theory also recognizes that in a large corporation with widely dispersed ownership, small 
shareholders do not have the capacity and resources   to monitor the managers. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
asserts that the principal can limit divergences by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and by 
incurring monitoring and bonding costs to protect owners interests. The mechanisms proposed to reduce 
conflicts in corporate entities however yield conflicting results. The theory asserts that agency conflicts could 
also be reduced by inducing managers to own shares in a company. However, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that 
large ownership may entrench managers leading to expropriation of corporate wealth which could decrease firm 
value and returns.  The agency theory also identifies concentrated ownership as a mechanism to reduce agency 
conflicts as they are considered to be more active in monitoring managers due to the size of ownership (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997).  The reasoning underlying this approach is that diffused ownership leads to low incentives 
for small shareholders to monitor, control or influence managers. However, several authors argue that controlling 
shareholders may extract private benefits from firms at the expense of minority shareholders (Barclay and 
Holderness, 1989; Dyck and Zingales 2004).   
Jensen and Meckling (1976) assert that agency problems can be resolved with appropriately designed 
contracts by specifying the rights belonging to agents and principals. Fama and Jensen (1983) refer to such 
contracts as rules which specify the rights of each agent in the organization, performance criteria on which 
agents are evaluated and remunerated. However given the problems associated with incompleteness of contracts, 
the theory provides the use of internal and external mechanisms to protect shareholders interests. Two 
recognized governance mechanisms used are compensation schemes and corporate boards. Incentive and 
compensation schemes are considered desirable when the managers have a significant informational and skill 
advantage which makes monitoring by the principal difficult. The theory specifies attributes necessary to make 
the board effective in supervising managers and include: a small size and diverse board with at least a third of 
the members being non executive and separation of roles for the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the 
chairman of board. The governance attributes identified are widely used as independent variables while 
investigating the relationship between corporate governance and financial performance of corporate entities. 
However the predicted interrelationships between these corporate board variables and firm performance 
yield conflicting results. Board size has been measured by the total number of directors (Adusei, 2011; 
Chaghadari, 2011; Yermack, 1996). However, it is notable that there is no optimal size of the board but some 
authors specify a small board to include of a maximum of seven to nine members to function effectively (Lipton 
and Lorsch, 1993; Yermack, 1996). A smaller board is considered more effective in coordination and in decision 
making (Yermack, 1996). However, some studies indicate that a larger board is more effective in monitoring and 
advising managers as organizations exist in complex business environments (Pfeffer, 1972).   
Diversity in corporate boards is often measured by the percentage of Non Executive Directors (NEDs) 
serving on the board (Adusei, 2011; Chaghadari, 2011). The (NEDs) are considered crucial in firm financial 
performance due to their role in monitoring and preventing conflict of interest between managers and 
shareholders (Chaghadari, 2011; CMA, 2002). According to Fama and Jensen (1983) they are more effective as 
they are concerned with maintaining their integrity and reputation in the labor market. The NEDs are also 
considered crucial in facilitating resource exchange between a firm and its external environment which could 
enrich corporate strategies and decision making (Pearce and Zahra, 1992). The relationship between NEDs and 
corporate performance is therefore expected to be positive.  However, a frequent criticism of NEDs is that they 
do not have sufficient knowledge of the company’s business to enable them give strategic leadership in a firm’s 
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fundamental business (Bozec, 2005). The insider directors are therefore considered to be more effective than the 
NEDs as they possess superior information necessary for decision making. From this perspective, a large 
proportion of NEDs would have a negative impact on firm performance. 
Diversity should also entails reflecting the structure of the society, gender balance, ethnicity and diverse 
professions to enable a firm respond effectively to the dynamic of business environment. Under this 
consideration, corporate entities are expected to include women directors in their corporate boards to bring new 
perspectives useful in strategy formulation and understanding of certain markets. Women directors are also 
expected to bring in additional expertise, market networks and ethical views crucial in decision making and 
consequently firm performance (Letting et al., 2012).  According to Srindhi et al. (2011) boards with more 
women have greater public disclosure and better oversight of managers. However, critics of the gender diversity 
argue that board diversity should not be limited to gender balance, alone  as the skills, professional qualifications 
and experience are the fundamental criteria for performance (Yasser, 2012). The role of gender diversity in 
corporate boards has therefore remained controversial.  
The agency theory also emphasizes separation of the position of the CEO and that of the chairman of 
the board. According to Fama and Jensen, (1983) combining the role of CEO and chairmanship would provide 
CEOs with undue opportunity to influence decision making in corporate boards. The CEO duality would 
therefore weaken the board independency and consequently monitoring of managers. On the contrary, 
stewardship theory asserts that managers are trustworthy and good stewards of a firm’s resources and work to 
attain a higher level of corporate profits (Donaldson and Davis, 1994). This implies that combining the two roles 
would enhance   the performance of a firm.  
The Agency theory is crucial in corporate governance research as it utilizes constrained principal- agent 
relationships to generate a mix of governance variables which could enhance firm performance. The theory 
identifies managerial shareholding, concentrated ownership and corporate boards and managerial compensation 
as key variables in influencing firm performance. The theory also places greater emphasis on the economic 
incentives and vested interests of the contracting parties. One of the concerns in over this theory is that it 
empowers corporate boards to control the firm which leaves most shareholders outside the decision making 
process in a firm. The theory also focuses on the principal - agent conflicts in a firm which is narrow is as it 
considers shareholder and managers as the only two players in the firm could influence financial performance. 
However conflicts in a firm could arise from:  minority- majority shareholders, shareholder-creditor and 
shareholder- employee interactions. These types of conflicts can result into reduced returns to investors as well 
as the corporate value. 
  
3.3The Resource Based Theory 
The resource based theory focuses on the importance of resources as a critical factor for a firm to have a 
competitive advantage. The basic proposition of resource based theory is that there is need for linkages between 
the firm and outside resources. Pfeffer (1972) argues that firms need to exert control over their environment by 
co-opting the resources needed improve firm performance. The theory is derived from Penrose’s (1959) 
definition of a firm as a collection of physical and human resources crucial for its growth and performance. 
Barney (1991) defines the specific characteristics of resources that are most likely to create and sustain 
competitive advantage to an entity to include: all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm attributes, 
information, and knowledge controlled by a firm.  
A key argument of the resource dependence theory is that organizations attempt to exert control over 
their environment by co-opting the resources needed to survive (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The resource based 
theory gives a clear theoretical base for conceptualizing the influence of resources and capabilities   attracted 
from large shareholders and corporate boards to firm to financial performance. The theory has been used to 
hypothesize the relationship between the state, institutional, individual shareholders and firm performance. Using 
this theoretical base, Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) argue that large foreign institutional shareholders have good 
monitoring capabilities; bring technical and managerial expertise and help firms to expand market networks 
which could enhance firm performance positively. However, this relationship is inconclusive as Aguilera and 
Jackson (2003) argue that their financial focus and emphasis on liquidity makes them unwilling to commit to a 
long-term relationship in a company which could influence financial performance negatively. Under this 
theoretical framework, large domestic institutional shareholders are also considered a crucial resource in 
improving firm financial performance due to their role in monitoring of managers, focus on profits and bring 
additional expertise to a firm (Ongore et al., 2011; Mishari et al., 2012; Uwuigbe and Olusanmi, 2012). This 
would imply that the relationship between institutional share ownership is positive.  However, Wei, et al. (2005) 
indicates that some institutions are largely owned by the state and may not focus on profit goals.  
Corporate boards are also considered to be an important link between the firm and the essential 
resources that a firm needs from the external environment for superior performance. The appointment of 
outsiders on the board helps in gaining access to resources critical to firm success (Johnson et al., 1996).  The 
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outside directors are considered crucial as they bring resources to the company in the form of information, skills, 
access to key constituents such as suppliers, buyers, public policy makers, social groups as well as legitimacy. 
The directors also serve to connect the firms with external factors by co-opting the resources needed to survive 
in competitive environments (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). However, according to (Bozec, 2005) non executive 
directors do not have sufficient knowledge of a company’s fundamental business to give it a strategic leadership. 
The insider directors are therefore considered to be more effective as they possess superior information crucial 
for enhancing financial performance. From this perspective, a large proportion of NEDs would have a negative 
impact on firm performance. 
 
3.4The Stewardship Theory 
The stewardship theory considers managers to be good stewards of the corporations and diligently work to attain 
high levels of corporate profit and shareholders returns. Davis et al., (1997) argue that stewards derive a greater 
utility from satisfying organizational goals than through self-serving behavior. The theory suggests that 
managers tend to be more motivated to act in the best interest a firm than in their private interest. The theory is 
based on the assumption that the interest of shareholders and the interest of management are aligned and 
therefore management is motivated to take decisions that would maximize performance and the total value of the 
company (Davis et al., 1997). The stewardship theory therefore suggests that managers should be given 
autonomy based on trust, which reduces the cost of monitoring and control of the managers and directors. Under 
this theoretical framework, executive directors can influence performance positively as they understand a 
company’s business better, leading to efficiency in decisions making.  
The stewardship theory is credited for uniquely focusing on governance structures that facilitate rather 
than monitor and control. The theory therefore takes a more relaxed view of the separation of the role of 
chairman and CEO, and supports the appointment of a single person for the position of chairman and CEO and a 
majority of executive directors rather than NEDs. Thus the validity of interrelationship between corporate boards 
and firm performance has to be evaluated with due consideration to the principles of the stewardship theory. 
However, the stewardship theory contradicts the agency theory as managers are considered to pursue their own 
interests which are detrimental to firm performance. 
 
3.5Stakeholder Theory 
The stakeholder’s theory holds that corporations serve a broader purpose than just maximizing the wealth of 
shareholders. It is therefore considered an extension of agency theory given the need to take care of stakeholders 
key to the achievement of a firms objectives through improved customer relations, employee motivation and 
supplier stability. The theory articulated by Freeman (1994) directs how managers operate and emphasizes the 
need to have corporate accountability to groups or individuals that interact with a firm and that affect or are 
affected by the achievement of the firm’s objectives. Freeman et al. (2004) indicates that the theory encourages 
managers to articulate the shared sense of the value they create, and what brings its core stakeholders together. 
This propels the firm forward and allows it to generate outstanding performance, determined both in terms of its 
purpose and service to its stakeholders. 
Consequently, organizations are expected to take into account the interests interest groups linked to it 
through social, environmental and ethical considerations (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman et al., 2004). 
However, one of the key concerns in corporate governance is to identify the relevant stakeholders. According to 
Freeman et al. (2004), a stakeholder is any group of individuals who can affect or be affected by the activities of 
the firm, in achieving its objectives.  Clarkson (1994) argues that any stakeholder is relevant if they have 
invested in a firm and their investment is open to risk from the activities of the organization. Wheeler and 
Sillanpaa (1997) identified stakeholder as varied groups comprising of investors, managers, employees, 
customers, business partners, local communities, civil society, the natural environment, future generations and 
non-human species. 
The stakeholder theory is relevant in corporate governance studies as it directs managerial behavior in 
corporate entities. It recognizes stakeholders as a mechanism to ensure efficient operation of a company. 
Freeman (1994) argues that the managers react to pressures put forth by stakeholders as it gives them legitimacy 
and relevance. The current governance approaches also underscore the economic value created by people who 
come together and cooperate to improve firm performance. Managers must therefore develop relationships and 
inspire their stakeholders to give their best to enhance the value the firm.  Consequently many firms have 
developed governance practices highly consistent with the stakeholder theory.  
The stakeholder theory like the resource dependency theory, proposes the representation of the various 
interest groups on the organization’s board in order to attract crucial resources from the environment. According 
to Turnbull (1997), they are considered instrumental to corporate success as their participation in corporate 
decision-making can enhance returns, efficiency and corporate value. The involvement of stake holders also 
ensures consensus building and to avoid conflicts in a firm (IFC, 2009). The involvement of stakeholders in 
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corporate management is therefore expected to contribute positively to firm performance. However, the key 
limitations of the  stakeholder theory in corporate governance  studies  is to identify the relevant stakeholders 
who have legitimate interests on the firm and can be affected by company’s policies and operations. The theory 
has also been criticized for putting too much burden on managers by making them accountable to many 
stakeholders without specific guidelines for solving problems resulting from conflicting interests.  
In summary, it is apparent from the review of the theories that each of theory gives prominence to a 
precise view on how corporate governance influences financial performance. The property rights theory gives 
prominence to the identity and size of property rights while agency theory focuses on the conflict of interest 
between the principals and agents. Contrary to the agency theory, the stewardship theory views managers as 
stewards and recommends alignment of interest between the steward and organizational objectives. The 
stakeholder theory considers the interests of different groups of stakeholders as crucial to firm performance. 
Resource based theory underscores the importance of resources to give organizations a competitive advantage. 
Consequently, large block shareholders and corporate boards are considered crucial in attracting resources and 
expertise required by corporate entities. It is therefore evident that theoretical literature shows lack of a unitary 
approach to explain the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. 
 
4.0 Research Philosophy 
Research philosophy is described as the foundation of knowledge on which underlying predispositions of any 
scientific inquiry are based. Different authors conclude that philosophical approaches adopted in a study 
determines the systematic plan of inquiry from the research design, data collection, and analysis techniques to 
result interpretation in answering research questions (Saunders et al., 2009; Sekaran, 2003; Cooper and Schindler, 
2003). Selecting the right research philosophical position is therefore important in increasing reliability and 
validity of the results. Proponents of philosophical paradigms indicate that scientific research is based on some 
philosophical approaches such as epistemology, ontology and axiology (Saunders et al., 2009; Guba and Lincoln, 
1994; Becker, 1996). The philosophical approaches give rise to differences in research methodological 
approaches and generate debates as to which philosophy is suitable for a particular subject. The divergences in 
philosophical approaches are discussed in the following subsections.  
 
4.1 Ontology of Research  
Ontology is defined as claims and assumptions that are made about the nature of reality, what exists, what units 
make it up and how these units interact with each other (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Saunders et al., 2009). 
According to Guba and Lincoln (1994) the key ontological concern is to identify the nature of reality and what 
can be known about it.  A clear distinction exists between objectivism and subjectivism as two ontological 
opposing positions which are accepted as producing valid knowledge. The two approaches may create a dilemma 
to researchers in making choices of the approach to follow as both are accepted as producing valid understanding 
of the nature of reality. Empirical philosophers such as David Hume (1711–76) held that reality subsists within 
the objects of perception and it can be constructed by making conjunctions between different events (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1994).  This perspective has been adopted by objective researchers who believe that what constitutes 
the reality can only be understood by studying relationships that are given meaning through the empirical 
analysis of concrete and causal relationships (Mendy, 2007). The objective researchers also assert that reality 
exist independent of the observer of the phenomena they are investigating (Burrell and Morgan 1979; Saunders 
et al., 2009).  
Subjectivists on the other hand hold that reality is a projection of human experience, perceptions and 
consequent actions of those social actors concerned with their existence. The subjective researchers also believe 
that reality is a continual process in that through the process of social interaction these social phenomena are in a 
constant state of revision (Saunders et al., 2009). The subjectivists therefore stress the necessity of studying the 
details of a phenomenon to understand the reality or perhaps the reality working behind them (Remenyi, et al., 
1998). This philosophical stance challenges the notion of objective knowledge that can be understood through 
causal relationships.  According to Husserl (1960) knowledge created could merely be regarded as an expression 
of the manner in which the subjective scientist has subconsciously imposed a personal reference frame on the 
world, which is quite often, wrongly regarded as lying in an external and separate sphere. 
Identification of ontology at the start of the research process is important as it determines the choice of 
the research design and methods of data analysis. Based on the literature, the most fundamental difference 
between objective and subjective ontological approaches is how researchers search for the reality. Given the 
research tradition observed in corporate governance studies, the ontological position adopted is objectivism as 
most researchers focus on studying causal relationships that are given meaning through the empirical analysis. 
This is supported by a large number of studies in corporate governance which examines the relationship between 
ownership structure and firm performance (Ongore, et al., 2011; Wei et al., 2005; Pervan, et al. 2012; Uwuigbe 
and Olusanmi, 2012). A second line of study also examines the relationship between corporate boards and firm 
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performance (Chaghadari, 2011; Latief et al. 2014; Letting et al., 2012; Rashid et al., 2010; Shukeri et al., 2012).  
 
4.2Epistemology of Research 
The second philosophical approach in research is epistemology which is concerned with what constitutes 
acceptable knowledge in a field of study, the nature and methods of acquiring knowledge through the research 
process (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Saunders et al., 2009). It has been defined as the branch of philosophy that 
studies the nature of knowledge, its presuppositions, foundations, extent and validity (Schostak, 2008). These 
definition raises questions  concerning how reality can be known, the relationship between the knower and what 
is known, the process of knowing and the possibility of that process being shared and repeated by others in order 
to assess the reliability and validity of the findings (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). The predicaments which may face 
the researchers arise from the splitting up of the epistemology approach into positivism and interpretivism which 
are two contrasting ways of discovery of knowledge. 
Positivism has been described as an approach under which valid knowledge is based on verification by 
way of using clear operational definitions, objectives, hypothesis testing and replicability (Anderson, 1983; 
Saunders, et al., 2009). According to Hunt (1962) positivism is unique since different investigators with varying 
attitudes, opinions and beliefs can ascertain the truth content of the theories laws and explanations. The rationale 
behind this philosophical approach is that evidence, as opposed to thought or discourse, is required to be able to 
make a satisfactory claim to have added to the body of knowledge (Remenyi et al., 1998). Weber, (2004) 
indicates that positivists tend to use large amounts of empirical data, selected randomly that can be analyzed 
statistically to detect underlying relationships. Explanations under positivists approach demonstrate causality and 
research progresses through hypotheses which can be tested for association or causality (Pathirage, et al., (2008).  
In contrast, the interpretivists believe that the qualities they ascribe to the objects they research are 
socially constructed and are products of their life-worlds (Healy and Perry, 2000; Weber, 2004). Researchers 
using this philosophical approach acknowledge that they have to participate in real-world life to some extent so 
as to better understand and express its emergent properties and features.  Consequently, the observer is part of 
what is being observed and human interest is the main drivers of the inquiry. According to Pathirage et al., 
(2008), sampling in this approach requires small numbers of cases chosen for specific reasons and the 
explanations tend to increase general understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. 
 The epistemological position that a researcher adopts is one of choice and has methodological 
consequences. The corporate governance research leans towards positivist approach as they seek to establish 
causal relationships using operational definitions, objectives and hypothesis testing. Researchers in this line of 
inquiry use theories such as property rights, agency and the resource based theories to develop hypothesis which 
are then confirmed or rejected (Wei et al., 2005; Pervan, et al., 2012; Uwuigbe and Olusanmi, 2012; Shukeri et 
al., 2012). The subjective researchers critical of positivism would argue that rich insights in corporate 
governance and firm performance would be lost if such interrelationships are reduced entirely to the prediction 
of theory alone. The researchers therefore acknowledge that firms which are the unit of analysis might have their 
own peculiar characteristics that can influence firm performance and may require in depth scrutiny. 
 
4.3 Axiology of Research  
Axiology is recognized as a philosophical stance concerned with judgments about value. Heron (1996) argues 
that researchers demonstrate axiological skill by articulating their values as the basis for making judgments about 
what research they are conducting and how they go about doing it.  Consequently, the role that values play in all 
stages of the research process is of great importance in making research results to be credible. However the 
classification of axiological   approach into value free and value laden may cause predicaments to researchers. 
However, Pathirage, et al. (2008) indicates that in value free research, the choice of what to study and how to 
study, is determined by objective criteria, while in value laden research choice is determined by human beliefs 
and experience. According to Guba and Lincoln (1994), objectivity responds to the positivist demand for 
neutrality and requires a demonstration that a given inquiry is free of bias and personal values.  Heron’s (1996) 
suggests the researchers may have to write their own statement of personal values in relation to the topic of study 
which informs decisions making and conclusions reached.   
On the other hand, research is considered to be value laden where the researcher is influenced by the 
world views, cultural experiences and upbringing. Consequently, the choice of axiological approach is a 
reflection of the epistemological position taken by researchers. It can be argued that most studies examining the 
relationship between corporate governance and financial performance adopt value free axiological position 
which is associated with objective and positivism approaches. Values and biases are prevented from influencing 
outcomes as researcher outline methods and procedures to follow. Through statistical analysis, the use of 
regression model with a robust standard error option controls for individual characteristics which could be 
sources of bias and errors in data values.  
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4.4Induction versus Deduction Approach in Research  
Induction and deduction are also categorized in research as two distinct approaches to discovery of knowledge 
(Saunders et al., 2009: Burney, 2008). Several authors indicate that deductive research proves findings and 
conclusions based on well-grounded theories, recognized facts and involves generation and use of quantitative 
data, testing of hypothesis, and analysis of causal relationship (Collins and Hussey, 2003; Gill and Johnson, 2002; 
Pathfage, et al., 2008).  Saunders et al. (2009) outlines sequential stages through which deductive research 
progresses and indicates that a researcher begins by identifying theories that inform the subject area, develops 
hypotheses and conducts research in order to test whether the theories and hypotheses can be proven true or false 
with specific cases. Accordingly, deductive reasoning follows a top down approach as it begins by identifying a 
theory about the topic of interest and narrows into more specific hypotheses that can be tested to confirm or 
reject of the theoretical propositions.  
On the other hand, Heit, (2009) argues that inductive reasoning begins with specific observations of the 
phenomenon, and progresses analytically to broader generalizations and theories based on the observed cases. 
Gill and Johnson (2002) claims that the justification for an inductive approach in the social sciences research 
revolves around the explanation of social phenomena grounded on observation and experience. With this method, 
a researcher identifies patterns and trends amongst a set of data, which is then used to formulate some 
hypotheses to explore, and finally develop general conclusions or theories (Gill and Johnson,2002, Pathfage et 
al., 2008; Saunders et al., 2009). The approach therefore takes a bottom up approach, as it starts with specific 
cases on the ground and works its way up to the abstract level of theory. In sharp contrast to the deductive 
tradition, theory is the outcome of induction process in research. 
Inductive reasoning is considered to be more open ended and exploratory while deductive reasoning is 
narrower as it is generally used to test or confirm hypotheses. Saunders et al. (2009) argue that it possible to 
combine deduction and induction within the same of research.  
However, Orton (1997), admit that although research is a function of both inductive and deductive 
analyses, researchers must present their research as either inductive or deductive. Within the corporate 
governance disciplines, deductive reasoning is widely used as researchers formulate hypotheses which are made 
operational and tested. The empirical results confirm or reject the theory and leads to empirical generalization.  
 
4.5 Qualitative Versus Quantitative Approaches in Research 
The above-mentioned philosophical approaches lead to a distinction between qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies and in reference to sample size, data  and analysis. Accordingly to Smith (1988), quantitative 
research is based on meanings derived from numerical and standardized data and involves counting and 
measuring of events and performing the statistical analysis. The main concern of the quantitative approach is that 
measurements are reliable, valid, and generalizable in its clear prediction of cause and effect (Cassell and Symon, 
1994).  Consequently, groups studied are larger, randomly selected and the types of data collected are in 
numerical form and the principal tool for data analysis is linear regression which aims to test hypotheses, looking 
at cause effect, and making predictions among variables.  This approach also allows generalizations of results 
from a sample to an entire population of interest (Pathirage et al., 2008). 
Qualitative research on the other hand aims to understand and interpret social interactions and focuses 
on the study of the whole and not variables. Several characteristics of qualitative inquiry distinguish it from the 
quantitative approach. Saunders et al., (2009) indicate that approaches used in data collection include open- 
ended responses, in depth interviews usually conversational rather than structured while the type of data 
collected includes words, images, participant observations, field notes, and reflections. Pathfage et al., (2008) 
also indicates that groups studied are smaller and not randomly selected and the types of data analysis involve 
identification of patterns, features, themes.  
The methodologies largely followed in corporate governance studies depends on research questions and 
objectives of the study. Most of the studies examine the interrelationships among   corporate governance 
variables and firm performance. The empirical approach largely followed is deductive as it involves 
identification of theories that inform the subject area, generation and use of quantitative data, testing of 
hypothesis, analysis of causal relationship.  This approach also leads to quantitative approach in reference to the 
sample size, data collection  and analysis. It is apparent from literature that the authors use large samples, and 
data is analyzed using regression analysis . For instance, Wei et al., (2005) uses a sample of 5,284 firm years to 
examine the relationship between China's partially privatized companies and firm performance. Pervan et al., 
(2012) also used a total of 1,430 observations while examining the relationship between Ownership and 
Performance in Croatian Listed Firms. Uwuigbe and Olusanmi (2012) also uses data from 31 listed companies 
for the period 2006-2010. Researchers also examining the relationship between corporate boards and financial 
performance also use a similar approach. Shukeri et al. (2012) used a sample of 300 public listed companies in 
examining the influence of board of directors and firm performance. Letting et al. (2012) used a sample of   40 
companies while examining the relationship between Board Diversity and Performance of Companies Listed in 
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Nairobi Stock Exchange 
 
5.0Conclusion   
The purpose of this paper was to analyze predicaments that researchers face in both theory and philosophical 
approaches in corporate governance. It is apparent that theoretical literature shows lack of a unitary approach to 
explain the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. The property rights theory focuses 
on the identity and size of property rights as the key variables that influence firm performance. Agency theory is 
centered on the shareholders-managers conflicts. In contrast to agency theory, the stewardship theory considers 
managers to be good stewards who act in the best interest of a firm. The resource based view places emphasis on 
resources acquired by firms from external environment to create competitive advantage and enhance corporate 
value. The stakeholder’s theory considers the role of stakeholder in influencing financial performance. 
Consequently, researchers may have to   adopt a multi-theory approach by taking perspectives of property rights 
agency, resource based and stewardship theories to derive a more holistic approach in examining the 
interrelationships between corporate governance and financial performance. Some theoretical propositions also 
yield inconsistent predictions. For instance, while agency theory argues that managers pursue their private 
interests and therefore influence performance negatively, the stewardship theory considers managers to be good 
stewards who act in the best interest of a firm. Institutional investors are considered to influence performance 
positively as they are considered to be endowed with resources and skills crucial to performance. However it is 
also argued that large controlling shareholders may extract private benefits from the firm which could eventually 
reduces firm performance.  
The dichotomy of philosophical approaches creates dilemma as to which approach is best suited in an 
area of inquiry. This study observes that the identification of ontology at the start of the research process is 
critically important as it determines the choice of the research design and methods of data analysis and 
interpretation. It  is apparent most  corporate  governance studies largely adopt objectivism ontology which  
leads to positivism epistemology, largely associated with  value free axiology, deductive research approach and 
consequently, quantitative research methods. This is opposed to the choice of subjectivism ontology which leads 
to the selection of interpretivism epistemology, value ridden axiology, inductive approach and the application of 
qualitative methods of data collection and analysis. 
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